Sebastian Junger’s New Book and Walter J. Ong’s Thought by Farrell, Thomas J.
1 
Sebastian Junger’s New Book and Walter J. Ong’s Thought 
 
Thomas J. Farrell 
Professor Emeritus in Writing Studies 
University of Minnesota Duluth 
tfarrell@d.umn.edu 
http://www.d.umn.edu/~tfarrell 
 
Monday, May 30, 2016, was Memorial Day. Surely it is fitting for us to remember those 
American soldiers who died in combat. But Sebastian Junger’s elegantly written new book 
Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging reminds us not to forget the problems of post-traumatic-
stress disorder (PTSD) and suicide among returning veterans of war. No doubt PTSD and suicide 
among returning veterans are big problems that we need to address. I commend Junger for 
addressing these problems to the best of his ability. And I hope that his elegantly written new 
book prompts further discussion of these big problems. 
However, because I am a wee bit older than Junger (I was born in 1944; he, in 1962), I tend to 
use a larger conceptual framework of thought that he gives no evidence of knowing about. Let 
me explain certain key aspects of the larger conceptual framework of thought that I prefer to 
work with. Perhaps the larger framework of thought I explain below will help contribute to 
further discussion of the big problems Junger discusses. However, in what follows here, I do not 
make any specific concrete proposals for how we Americans collectively might help alleviate the 
problems of PTSD and suicide among returning veterans. But I think that the larger conceptual 
framework of thought that I explain here may help us collectively to better understand the big 
problems and certain issues Junger discusses. 
C. G. Jung, M.D. (1875-1961), the Swiss psychiatrist and psychological theorist, claimed that the 
human psyche includes what he refers to as the collective unconscious. He famously worked out 
an approach (known as Jungian analysis) to helping individual persons integrate contents of the 
collective unconscious into their conscious awareness inasmuch as it is possible to do this. 
But we should avoid romanticizing the collective unconscious, because not all impulses arising 
from the collective unconscious prompt us to engage in pro-social behavior. For this reason, we 
should carefully discern impulses arising from the collective unconscious. By discernment, I 
mean wrestling with impulses that come to us, as the biblical character Jacob famously wrestles 
with the angel of God who comes to him in his sleep. 
Now, by definition, Jungian analysis involves one-to-one interactions between the analyst and 
the patient. However, Jung himself encouraged the formation of a social group known as a club 
in Zurich for various Jungian analysts and patients undergoing Jungian analysts. 
The collective unconscious carries memories of our small-group hunter-gatherer ancestors that 
Darcia Narvaez in psychology at the University of Notre Dame writes about in her award-
winning 2014 book Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture, 
and Wisdom (Norton). 
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By definition, our small-group hunter-gatherer ancestors were pre-literate and pre-philosophical 
people. They lived in what the American Jesuit cultural historian and theorist Walter J. Ong 
(1912-2003) refers to as primary oral cultures. To spell out the obvious, Ong belonged to the 
religious order of men in the Roman Catholic Church known as the Jesuits (known formally as 
the Society of Jesus). Perhaps we can liken the Jesuits, at least in spirit, to the spirit of the club in 
Zurich that Jung helped found. 
In addition, Narvaez writes skillfully about the work of the American neurosurgeon Paul D. 
MacLean, M.D. (1913-2007). MacLean refers to the oldest evolutionary layer, or part, of the 
human brain as the reptilian brain. The reptilian brain is the biological base of our 
fight/flight/freeze response. In short, our reptilian brains are oriented toward protectiveness and 
vigilance about possible perceived threats. However, when we are over-stressed, our reptilian 
brains may be triggered, sparking hyper-vigilance and aggressivity in certain circumstances 
when dynamic calm under the circumstances in question would be more desirable and effective. 
So the symptoms of post-traumatic-stress disorder involve the reptilian brain, just as fighting in 
combat involves the reptilian brain.  
In the book Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (Cornell University Press, 
1981), the published version of Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Ong does 
not happen to advert explicitly to MacLean’s work on the structure of the human brain. But the 
spirit of fighting for life is biologically based in the fight/flight/freeze response of the reptilian 
brain. 
The part of the human psyche that Plato (428/427 to 348/347 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE) 
refer to as thumos (or thymos) is also biologically based in the fight/flight/freeze response of the 
human brain. 
In the phenomenon known as male bonding, the males involved in the bonding are engaging 
their reptilian brains. No doubt our reptilian brains are also engaged in other forms of bonding as 
well. Perhaps the reptilian brain is involved in all different kinds of attachments we form. In any 
event, when we lose a significant attachment in our life, we need to mourn that loss in a healthy 
way. But if we are incapable of mourning our losses in a healthy way, we may go through life 
burdened by unresolved mourning issues. 
By definition, post-traumatic-stress disorder involves traumas involving attachments and loss. 
Thus PTSD involves unresolved mourning. 
But the attachment we form with our birth mother most likely begins in our mother’s womb. As 
the fetus forms and grows in the mother’s womb, brain forms and develops in the fetus, 
including of course the reptilian brain. The developing fetus in the mother’s womb feels the 
mother’s bodily chemistry and rhythms. The mother’s bodily chemistry and rhythms register on 
the developing fetus in the womb. As a result, the developing fetus in the womb forms a deep 
bond with the mother. That bond with the birth mother is formed prior to birth and is deeper than 
attachments the baby forms after being born. 
In Junger’s terminology about belonging, our deepest sense of belonging evokes our experience 
in our mother’s womb. 
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In Ong’s terminology about the sound/sight contrast, sound also evokes our experience in our 
mother’s womb. So when Ong heralds our contemporary communications media that accentuate 
sound, he in effect understands how sound evokes deeper human experiences than sight 
generally does. But of course both sight and sound as well as touch and taste and smell and 
possibly other sensory affects may be involved in evoking PTSD. 
However, when we experience a deep sense of being at home in the cosmos, our experience is 
most likely evoking our experience of oneness with our mother in her womb. See, for example, 
David Toolan’s book At Home in the Cosmos Orbis Books, 2001). 
Regarding attachments new-born infants form after birth, see the British psychiatrist and Jungian 
theorist Anthony Stevens’ book Archetype Revisited: An Updated Natural History of the Self 
(Inner City Books, 2003). 
Now, Junger repeatedly discusses American Indians as examples of people who lived and 
worked together in tribes – in Narvaez’s terminology, small-group hunter-gatherers. His thesis is 
that soldiers in combat live and work together with one another in a way that he likens to 
American Indians living and working together with one another in a tribe. I understand the point 
of his analogy. However, as Junger understands, the draft would be a better analogy with tribal 
warriors than our all-volunteer armed forces are. 
No doubt our small-group hunter-gatherer ancestors discussed by Narvaez lived and worked 
cooperatively with one another within their small groups in order to stay alive and perhaps 
flourish. No doubt they experienced a strong sense of belonging within their group – a sense of 
belonging that most contemporary Americans rarely experience in any group they may belong to. 
But Junger argues that American Indian tribes had ways of reintegrating warriors returning from 
battle into pro-social life again within the tribe that we Americans today do not have for 
reintegrating combat veterans back into pro-social life in American society. Oftentimes, 
returning combat veterans do not experience a sense of homecoming and belonging back in 
American society that is comparable in spirit and intensity to group bonding of soldiers in 
combat. 
After all, most contemporary Americans have been detribalized, to put it mildly, by their 
American upbringing and social and cultural and educational conditioning. Even those of us who 
have NOT experienced the group bonding of soldiers in war may NOT have experienced strong 
and intense bonding with others in small groups to which we belong. 
Of course critiques of so-called individualism in American life are a dime a dozen. Basically, 
Junger is adding his voice to such critiques. Nevertheless, he works out a fresh framework of 
thought for discussing the serious problems of PTSD and suicide among returning veterans of 
war. 
In addition to favoring so-called individualism, we Americans of European descent are so 
detribalized that we tend to refer pejoratively to real or imagined so-called tribalism. For 
example, certain critics of the billionaire developer Donald Trump of New York, the Republican 
Party’s presumptive presidential candidate in 2016, tend to characterize him and his political 
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persona as representing authoritarianism and his enthusiastic supporters as representing the spirit 
of tribalism. 
No doubt our current ideas about authoritarianism are based on the historical examples of 
fascism in Europe. No doubt fascism in Europe involved mass movements in which individual 
persons were submerged to the will of the political strong-man. But we Americans of European 
descent tend to think of such mass movements as involving tribalism, but writ large. 
At times, for the purposes of waging war, American Indian tribes formed alliances. For example, 
Junger discusses how the American Indian leader and orator known as Pontiac (or Obwandiyag, 
1720-1769) helped forge an alliance of American Indian tribes for the purpose of taking a stand 
against the British. Pontiac’s War (1763-1766) is named after him. 
Now, in the Hebrew Bible, after Jacob wrestles with the angel of God who came to him in his 
sleep, he receives a new name: Israel. He is portrayed as having twelve sons. We are told that 
each of the twelve tribes of Israel is named after one of the sons of Jacob/Israel. And the twelve 
tribes of Israel form an alliance to help fight against invading forces. 
Now, the Canadian cultural historian and theorist Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) uses the terms 
detribalization and retribalization routinely in his experimental but flawed book The Gutenberg 
Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (University of Toronto Press, 1962). 
What McLuhan means by detribalization is equivalent to what the Harvard sociologist David 
Riesman (1909-2002) means by inner-directed persons in his famous book The Lonely Crowd: A 
Study of the Changing American Character (Yale University Press, 1950). With the memory of 
European fascism fresh in his mind, Riesman, who was himself undoubtedly an inner-directed 
person, discusses what he refers to pejoratively and apprehensively as the emerging other-
directed persons in contemporary American culture. (However, Ong was quick to note that being 
other-directed is not necessarily something pejorative.) 
McLuhan, who was also undoubtedly an inner-directed person (as most academics to this day 
tend to be), uses the term retribalization pejoratively and apprehensively. Because the mass 
movements of fascism in Europe can be characterized as representing retribalization writ large, 
Junger’s use of the analogy with American Indian tribes will probably face predictable 
difficulties with Americans of European descent. 
Now, in the article “World as View and World as Event” in the journal American 
Anthropologist, volume 71, number 4 (August 1969): pages 634-647, Ong describes two broad 
senses of life: (1) the world-as-view sense of life and (2) the world-as-event sense of life. 
Also see anthropologist David M. Smith’s 1997 essay “World as Event: Aspects of Chipewyan 
Ontology,” reprinted, slightly revised, in the ambitious anthology Of Ong and Media Ecology, 
edited by Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup (New York: Hampton Press, 2012, pages 117-
141). 
The American Indian tribes discussed by Junger and the small-group hunter-gatherers discussed 
by Narvaez embody and manifest the world-as-event sense of life. 
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But the detribalized Europeans and Americans in modern culture in the West (in McLuhan’s 
terminology, in the Gutenberg galaxy that emerged in the West after the Gutenberg printing 
press emerged in the 1450s) embody and manifest the world-as-view sense of life. Typically, our 
American upbringing and social and cultural and educational conditioning today inculcate and 
habituate us in the world-as-view sense of life. 
However, I assume that the world-as-event sense of life is remembered in the collective 
unconscious (in Jung’s terminology). As a result, we American progressives and liberals today 
may want to access the world-as-event sense of life in the collective unconscious inasmuch as we 
can. 
Please note that I do not think that anti-60s conservatives today would have any interest in 
accessing the world-as-event sense of life in the collective unconscious. Anti-60s conservatives 
have not yet effectively digested certain political and social and cultural changes in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Moreover, anti-60s conservatives tend to look back on the 1950s with nostalgia. 
However, in the 1950s, under the Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969), the 
inter-state highway system emerged. Often enough, inter-state highways cut deep concrete strips 
into existing communities in urban areas, thereby effectively severing them into two parts. So 
progressives and liberals should beware of anti-60s conservatives with their endless cries for 
community and their selective memories of community before the inter-state highways emerged 
in the 1950s. 
For a study of conservative anti-60s rhetoric, see Philip Jenkins’ book Decade of Nightmares: 
The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Now, Jung and his followers refer to forming an axis between ego-consciousness and the Self 
(capitalized to differentiate it from ego-consciousness, which others often refer to as the self 
[lower-case]). So perhaps we American progressives and liberals today can form an axis, as it 
were, between the conditioned world-as-view sense of life of our ego-consciousness and the 
world-as-event sense of life remembered in the collective unconscious. 
But a word of caution is in order here. At times, unconscious contents can surface with such 
power that they overpower ego-consciousness, resulting in a psychotic episode. For 
understandable reasons, most people would prefer not to experience a psychotic episode. So 
before you try to undertake possibly working out and establishing an axis between your ego-
consciousness and the world-as-event sense of life remembered in the collective unconscious, 
you should make sure that you have sufficient ego strengths to undertake such a possibly 
perilous inner journey. Even so, I do NOT recommend using the approach that Jung himself 
recklessly experimented with that he refers to as active imagination. 
Because Jung recklessly favored what he refers to as active imagination, he often inveighs 
against the form of guided imagistic meditation outlined in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius 
Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits. But even that form of guided imagistic meditation can be 
dangerous for certain people, who can experience a psychotic episode as a result of using it. Let 
me briefly explain why even guided imagistic meditation can precipitate a psychotic episode in 
certain people. 
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Ong never tired of referring to Eric A. Havelock’s book Preface to Plato (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1963). Havelock sets up and works with a contrast between the 
Homeric epics with their imagistic thinking and Plato’s dialogues. Havelock sees the Homeric 
epics as representing oral tradition, basically pre-literate and pre-philosophical thought. 
Havelock sees the ancient Greek philosophical thought in Plato’s dialogues as emerging 
historically as the result of phonetic alphabetized and vowelized writing in ancient Greek culture. 
Now, did Plato also occasionally use narratives and imagistic thought in his dialogues? You bet, 
he did. See John Alexander Stewart’s compilation and translation in the bilingual edition titled 
The Myths of Plato (London and New York: Macmillan, 1905). 
But the important point here is that Havelock see imagistic thought in the Homeric epics as 
expressing oral tradition (i.e., pre-literate thought, even though the Homeric epics obvious got 
written down). So guided imagistic meditations in Ignatian spirituality can potentially resonate 
with the world-as-event sense of life remembered in the collective unconscious. As a result of the 
potential danger of prompting a psychotic episode, I do NOT recommend making a 30-day 
retreat in silence following the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, as Jesuit novices 
customarily do.  
However, if you want to read about the perils of the perilous inner journey of one person who 
was acculturated in the world-as-view sense of life, check out the poems of the Victorian Jesuit 
poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) that literary critics refer to as his “terrible sonnets” – 
not because they are terrible poetry (they are not), but because they describe inner experiences 
that sound terrible. 
By today’s standards, did Hopkins’ terrible-sounding inner experiences show that he was 
clinically depressed? I don’t know if he was clinically depressed technically, but he was 
undoubtedly struggling with depression to the best of his ability. But struggling with depression 
requires certain ego strengths to sustain the struggle. If we do not have sufficient ego strengths to 
sustain the struggle with depression, we may give up and commit suicide. 
Now, in his first book Frontiers in American Catholicism: Essays on Ideology and Culture 
(Macmillan, 1957), Ong urges his fellow American Catholics to construct and work out and 
develop what he refers to as “a real Christian mystique of technology and science” (page 121; 
also see pages 123-125). Ong seems to believe that the Christian tradition of thought contains 
certain elements that could indeed be used to construct the new Christian mystique of technology 
and science that he envisions. He may be right about that much. But it is easier to envision this 
possible development that it is to do it. In any event, it has not yet emerged. 
Nevertheless, Ong’s repeated use of the term “mystique” suggests that he is deliberately echoing 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl’s famous characterization of the “participation mystique” – in Ong’s 1969 
terminology, the world-as-event sense of life. See Levy-Bruhl’s book How Natives Think, 
authorized translation by Lilian A. Clare, with a new introduction by C. Scott Littleton 
(Princeton University Press, 1985). 
Now, I would say that the mystique Ong envisions as possibly emerging from certain elements in 
the Christian tradition of thought may still be desirable for Christians to work on. But I would 
also say that a new mystique of technology and science needs to emerge not only from Christian 
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resources of thought, but also from non-Christian resources of thought – and preferably one that 
secularists could also endorse. 
Such an envisioned new mystique of technology and science should accompany our efforts to 
work toward a new cultural mix of our world-as-view sense of life with the world-as-event sense 
of life remembered in the collective unconscious. 
Also see Ong’s foreword to the book Pius XII and Technology, compiled by Leo J. Haigerty 
(Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing 1962, pages vii-x). Basically, Ong is not a techno-phobe. 
By way of digression, I want to call attention to the alleged spirit of academic freedom and 
tenure alleged in American institutions of higher education as analogous to certain pro-social 
features Junger mentions in connection with American Indian tribes and belonging. In addition, I 
want to call attention to how the Jesuit religious order that Ong belonged to is analogous to 
belonging to an American Indian tribe, as are all religious orders of men and women in the 
Roman Catholic Church. Arguably belonging to a church is also analogous to belonging to an 
American Indian tribe. But most Christian churches tend to give their members a strong sense of 
belonging in exchange for their thinking in certain ways dictated by the church authorities. In 
other words, most Christian churches tend to foster a community of affinity (like-minded 
people), but not a community of otherness, as the late American Buber scholar Maurice 
Friedman (1921-2012) describes these two kinds of community in his short book Genuine 
Dialogue and Real Partnership: Foundations of True Community (Trafford Publishing, 2011).   
Now, Junger, rightly in my judgment, cautions us not to romanticize American Indian tribes. He 
says, “It’s easy for people in modern society to romanticize Indian life . . . . That impulse should 
be guarded against” (page 13). Fair enough. 
In his widely known book Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (London: Blond 
& Briggs, 1973), E. F. Schumacher (Ernst Friedrich, 1911-1972) does not happen to use imagery 
of a tribe explicitly. 
In his widely discussed recent eco-encyclical, Pope Francis also criticizes modern capitalism for 
proceeding as if people didn’t matter. Like Schumacher, he does not happen to use imagery of a 
tribe explicitly. 
In American popular culture, the Lone Ranger is a masked man who fights for the common good 
with his American Indian partner Tonto. If the Lone Ranger symbolically represents American 
individualism, then his partnership with an American Indian symbolizes what – the 
psychological partnership that Jung and his followers refer to as the axis between ego-
consciousness and the Self in the human psyche (in Jungian terminology, the Self in the human 
psyche symbolizes being in touch with the collective unconscious)? And what does the Lone 
Ranger’s being masked symbolize? 
In the title essay of Ong’s 1962 book The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays and 
Studies (Macmillan, pages 260-285), he works with the Greek/barbarian contrast to refer to 
outsiders inside society today. He constructs an extended comparison-and-contrast essay in 
which he articulates what he considers to be the Greek position and the barbarian position. What 
he considers to be the Greek position is deeply indebted to Pericles’ “Funeral Oration” as 
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Thucydides (c. 460-400 BCE) remembers and reconstructs it from his memory in his famous 
History of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles (c. 495-426 BCE) was a political leader and orator in 
Athens during its famous experiment with participatory democracy. 
In the Hebrew Bible, there is a famous injunction to remember that you were once strangers 
(outsiders in Ong’s terminology) in a strange land.  
It’s not just that the so-called outsider is inside society today. The far deeper problematic for 
American individualism today is that the collective unconscious (in Jung’s terminology) is inside 
the psyches of all Americans today. 
Now, in the book A Nation of Outsiders: How the White Middle Class Fell in Love with 
Rebellion in Postwar America (Oxford University Press, 2011), Grace Elizabeth Hale shows that 
Ong’s imagery of outsiders has become rather popular. But what about his imagery involving the 
Greek position he articulates? Evidently, Ong’s proverbial Greeks have become the political and 
cultural establishment against which Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont have 
inveighed in each of their respective presidential primary campaigns. 
In Senator Sanders’ oratory, he often makes it sound like Hillary Rodham Clinton symbolizes the 
establishment against which he is campaigning. In Trump’s oratory, she is “crooked Hillary.” 
Trump likes to use epithets to characterize individual persons he doesn’t like and wants to 
diminish. Epithets are used extensively in the Homeric epics (e.g., wily Odysseus). 
While white middle-class Americans were pursuing their fantasy lives about being outsiders in 
rebellion in postwar America, many of them also helped mainstream American Indian 
spirituality, as Philip Jenkins details in his book Dream Catchers: How Mainstream America 
Discovered Native Spirituality (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
Now, at a later time, Ong himself shifted away from his earlier Greek/barbarian terminology in 
his “Introduction: On Saying ‘We’ and ‘Us’ to Literature” in the book Three American 
Literatures: Essays in Chicano, Native American, and Asian-American Literature for Teachers 
of American Literature, edited by Houston A. Baker, Jr. (Modern Language Association of 
America, 1982, pages 3-8). In his introduction, Ong, who served as president of MLA in 1978, 
says, “All of us want to realize ourselves as distinct person, but we also want others – lots of 
others – to know that we are our own distinct selves. We do not want to be unique all alone. 
Hence we negotiate. And so do cultures” (pages 3-4). 
Perhaps American culture today is still engaged in negotiating with certain other cultures that 
many Americans previously thought of as outsiders (in Ong’s 1962 terminology). In Ong’s 1982 
terminology, we Americans of European descent may be negotiating our identities of “we” and 
“us” to integrate pro-social features of American Indian tribes. 
Trump has clearly been appealing to white identity politics that does not want to negotiate with 
the pro-social non-white political and social and cultural traditions also inside American society 
today. In this respect, white identity politics in American society today resembles the anti-
Semitic identity politics of German Nazis. 
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But those white Americans today are descended from white strangers (outsiders) who were 
historically strangers in a strange land. Ironically, many white supporters of Trump claim to be 
Christians. However, like the Hebrew Bible, the Christian Bible contains the injunction to 
remember that you were once strangers (outsiders) in a strange land. But I guess that Trump’s 
white supporters are Christians in name only (CINOs). In any event, Trump’s white supporters 
do not appear to be ready to negotiate their white political and social and cultural identity with 
the pro-social features of any non-white traditions. 
In conclusion, Junger deserves credit for calling our attention to the serious problems of PTSD 
and suicide among returning veterans. In addition, he deserves credit to calling our attention to 
the analogy between male bonding in combat and the warrior traditions among American 
Indians. I hope that his elegantly written book contributes to a national discussion of these two 
big problems and the issues he discusses.  
